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DECLARING DIRECTORS OF STATE-OWNED 
ENTITIES DELINQUENT: ORGANISATION 
UNDOING TAX ABUSE v MYENI* 
REHANA CASSIM 
Associate Professor, Department of Mercantile Law, University of South Africa
This note discusses and critically analyses the judgment in Organisation Undoing 
Tax Abuse v Myeni [2020] 3 All SA 578 (GP), in which the court declared a 
director delinquent for her lifetime in terms of s 162(5) of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008. The basis of the application related to the director’s conduct while she was a non-
executive director and chairperson of South African Airways SOC Ltd. The judgment 
is commendable for its strict stance against errant directors of state-owned companies. It 
is the first delinquency application brought by a party acting in the public interest, and 
the first judgment to impose a lifelong delinquency declaration on a director. 
Delinquent directors – s 162(5) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 – public 
interest – directors of state-owned entities
INTRODUCTION
In Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse v Myeni [2020] 3 All SA 578 (GP) 
(‘OUTA v Myeni’) the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria was faced with 
an application by the Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse NPC (‘OUTA’) 
and the South African Airways Pilots’ Association (‘SAAPA’) (‘the 
plaintiffs’) to declare delinquent Duduzile Cynthia Myeni (‘Myeni’) in 
terms of s 162(5) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (‘the Companies Act’). 
The South African Airways SOC Ltd (‘SAA’), Air Chefs SOC Ltd and the 
Minister of Finance were also cited as defendants, but no relief was sought 
against them. The basis of the application related to Myeni’s conduct while 
she was a non-executive director and chairperson of SAA. At the time the 
judgment was handed down, SAA was under business rescue. The North 
Gauteng High Court, Pretoria declared Myeni delinquent for her lifetime. 
* This note was written during leave granted to me by Unisa. I absolve Unisa 
from any responsibility for any opinions or conclusions contained in this note.
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The effect of a delinquency order is that a director is disqualified, for 
the duration of the order, from holding office as a director of a company 
(s 69(8)(a) of the Companies Act). This note critically evaluates the 
judgment in regard to the delinquency order against Myeni. The judgment 
is noteworthy for its strict stance against errant directors of state-owned 
companies, as it is the first time that a director has been declared to be 
delinquent for her lifetime. 
THE FACTS
Myeni was appointed a non-executive director of the SAA board in 2009, 
and had served in the capacity of chairperson and non-executive director 
from 2015 to 2017. In her capacity as a director of a state-owned entity, 
Myeni was a member of the accounting authority of SAA as contemplated 
in s 49 of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (‘PFMA’) — 
that is, a member of the board of a public entity. SAA is a state-owned 
entity and is listed as a major public entity under Schedule 2 of the 
PFMA. The basis of the plaintiffs’ application to declare Myeni delinquent 
related to conduct with regard to the ‘Emirates deal’ and the ‘Airbus 
Swap transaction’, which are discussed below. The judgment is lengthy, 
comprising 114 pages. The court usefully set out the facts in detail. For the 
purposes of this note the essential facts which are relevant to the discussion 
in this note have been summarised.
The Emirates deal
In essence, the Emirates deal was a code-sharing arrangement between 
SAA and Emirates, in terms of which SAA could purchase tickets on 
Emirates flights at reduced rates and sell them to its customers at a profit 
for SAA (OUTA v Myeni para 41). This deal offered many benefits for 
SAA, including a guaranteed income for SAA to maintain a new route 
from Johannesburg to Dubai (para 46). The chief commercial officer 
of SAA was tasked with leading the discussion with Emirates and with 
drafting the initial non-binding memorandum of understanding between 
SAA and Emirates (‘MOU’) (para 48). 
Witnesses for the plaintiffs alleged that Myeni had insisted on being 
directly involved in these discussions, which was unusual for a non-
executive director and chairperson (para 54). It was further alleged that 
Myeni delayed the signing of the MOU on several occasions. For example, 
shortly before the MOU was intended to be signed at a signing ceremony 
at the Paris Air Show in June 2015, without consulting the other board 
members, Myeni instructed the acting chief executive officer of SAA not 
to sign the MOU because there was an instruction to this effect from then 
President Zuma (para 79). The failure to sign the MOU at this event caused 
extensive harm to SAA’s reputation, not only with Emirates, but also 
locally and internationally (para 85). Further attempts by the acting chief 
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executive officer to circulate a round-robin resolution to the board seeking 
approval for the signing of the MOU were frustrated by Myeni (para 93). 
The failure of SAA to sign the MOU in subsequent months resulted in 
its relationship with Emirates deteriorating further, as a result of which 
the MOU was never in fact signed (para 114). The plaintiffs argued that 
Myeni’s actions in obstructing the signing of the MOU led to irreparable 
harm to SAA, its employees, and the country as a whole, and that she had 
acted recklessly in sabotaging the signing of the MOU (para 127).
The Airbus Swap transaction 
The Airbus Swap transaction was an agreement between SAA and Airbus 
in 2015 to cancel a contract for the purchase of ten Airbus A320-200 
aircraft and to substitute this with a new deal for SAA to lease five Airbus 
A330-300 aircraft directly from Airbus (para 134). This transaction was of 
critical importance to SAA, since it would enable SAA to escape onerous 
pre-delivery payments and inflated prices under the previous contract 
(para 135). If SAA defaulted on these payments, it faced the risk of 
triggering cross-default clauses on other loans and leases, with the effect 
that billions of Rand in debt would become due immediately (ibid). The 
conclusion of this transaction was also a key precondition to SAA receiving 
any further going concern guarantees from the state, which it relied on to 
remain afloat and to give comfort to its lenders (para 144). On 31 March 
2015, the SAA board unanimously resolved to approve the Airbus Swap 
transaction (para 141), and on 11 September 2015 the Minister of Finance 
unconditionally approved the transaction (para 142). All that remained 
was for the SAA board to ratify the signing of the execution documents by 
the acting chief executive officer and the chief financial officer (para 143). 
The plaintiffs argued that Myeni had repeatedly delayed the conclusion 
of this transaction. Even though the board had approved the transaction, 
it was alleged that Myeni engaged directly with Airbus in an attempt 
to renegotiate the deal (para 149). She sought unilaterally to change the 
terms of the transaction (in a letter to Airbus in September 2015) and 
to renegotiate a new deal with an African Aircraft Leasing Company 
without consulting with the other board members (paras 154–6), and she 
failed to heed warnings from SAA, Airbus and the Minister of Finance 
of the urgency regarding the conclusion of the Airbus Swap transaction 
(para 268). Furthermore, on 16 November 2015, Myeni submitted a new 
application to the Minister of Finance in terms of s 54(2) of the PFMA 
(‘the s 54(2) application’) to amend the approved transaction (para 193). 
This application was found to be grossly defective as it failed to disclose 
material facts, and was subsequently rejected by the Minister of Finance 
(paras 213 and 252). All the executive directors who had been opposed 
to Myeni’s plan were removed from office, placed on special leave, or 
resigned on the basis that their relationship with Myeni had become 
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intolerable (para 191). Eventually, on 22 December 2015, after the Minister 
of Finance and National Treasury intervened, the necessary approvals 
of the board were obtained and communicated to Airbus (para 220). 
The plaintiffs argued that had Airbus issued a default notice regarding the 
payment of the pre-delivery payments due to SAA’s failure to conclude 
the transaction, SAA would have been forced into business rescue or 
liquidation (para 223). In this event, it was argued, the state would have 
faced a call on its guarantees, and this would have jeopardised the state at a 
time of economic and political turmoil and would have had a catastrophic 
domino effect on other state-owned entities and the economy (ibid).
JUDGMENT
The court, per Tolmay J, found that Myeni’s testimony on the Emirates deal 
was confusing and contradictory, and that she failed to present evidence 
to support her testimony (paras 115–19). It held that Myeni’s obstruction 
of the MOU was based on her failure to understand the workings of 
flight frequencies, which demonstrated a ‘reckless lack of care’ (para 125). 
Furthermore, by failing to take any steps to expedite the signing of the 
MOU, the court found that Myeni had contravened cl 12.2.3 of the 
2014/2015 SAA Shareholder’s Compact (which governed the affairs 
of SAA), and which stated that the board ‘will use its best endeavours 
to prevent undue delays with regard to critical decisions’ (para 126). 
The court stated that, based on the evidence, it would never know whether 
Myeni was indeed instructed by former President Zuma not to sign the 
MOU (para 127). But, the court stated, this was not determinative of 
the question of her delinquency, as it was common cause that Myeni had 
given instructions, to the detriment of SAA and the whole country, not 
to proceed with the signing of the MOU (ibid). The court found further 
that Myeni had no reasonable grounds to block the signing of the MOU, 
at the Paris Air Show or at any time thereafter (para 132). The court ruled 
that Myeni ‘deliberately or through gross negligence’ inflicted substantial 
harm on SAA (para 238), and that her belated attempts to justify her 
conduct showed that she had acted ‘dishonestly, in bad faith and not in the 
best interests of SAA and the country’ (ibid). 
Likewise, the court stated that Myeni could not offer any plausible 
explanation for delaying the Airbus Swap transaction (para 153) and that 
her evidence was inconsistent (para 226). It ruled that Myeni’s letter to 
Airbus in September 2015 was grossly negligent as it misrepresented facts 
to Airbus and was sent without the authority of the board (para 244). The 
court further ruled that this letter violated s 77(3)(a) of the Companies Act, 
read with s 162(5)(c)(iv)(bb), since Myeni had acted in SAA’s name and had 
signed the letter on behalf of SAA, despite knowing that she lacked the 
authority to do so (para 247). The court held that there was ‘deliberate 
dishonesty and a gross abuse of power’ by Myeni, ‘as contemplated in 
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s 162(5)(c)(i) of the Companies Act’ (para 246). Her attempt unilaterally to 
renegotiate the Airbus Swap transaction indicated recklessness (para 249). 
A further ground of delinquency, the court stated, is that the s 54(2) 
appli cation was ‘dishonest and failed to disclose material facts’ (para 252). 
Her failure to ensure that the s 54(2) application contained all the relevant 
information was also found to be grossly negligent (para 257). By delaying 
the conclusion of the Airbus Swap transaction and by failing to disclose 
material facts, Myeni had, according to the court, acted contrary to the 
duties of good faith and honesty as set out in s 50(1)(b), s ‘50(c)’ [sic] (which 
should be s 50(1)(c)), and s 54(2) (information to be submitted by accounting 
authority) of the PFMA (paras 253–4), and had wilfully and recklessly 
contributed to SAA breaching its financial reporting obligations under 
s 55(1) of the PFMA (para 265). The court stated that Myeni had knowingly 
taken SAA and South Africa to the brink of disaster by delaying the Airbus 
Swap transaction (para 260). Myeni’s attitude to placing SAA, other state-
owned entities and the economy at risk was found by the court to be one 
of ‘supine indifference’ (para 224).
The court imposed on Myeni an unconditional lifelong declaration of 
delinquency. The court also recommended that the National Prosecuting 
Authority (‘NPA’) investigate the evidence presented in the trial regarding 
possible criminal conduct, and ordered Myeni to pay the costs of the 
action on an attorney and client scale, including the costs of three counsel 
(para 285).
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
The application to join all the SAA board members 
Even though the plaintiffs had issued summons against Myeni in 2017 
when she was still a director of SAA, the matter was delayed several times 
due to Myeni filing numerous interlocutory applications, and was only 
heard in court in January 2020. One interlocutory application filed by 
Myeni was to join all the board members that served with her at SAA 
during her tenure, on the basis that they had acted as a collective whole and 
as a result could be sued substantially on the same questions of fact and law 
(see Myeni v Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse NPC [2019] ZAGPPHC 565 
para 61). The court dismissed this interlocutory application on the ground 
that the delinquency claim against the other directors had prescribed in 
terms of s 162(2)(a), since a delinquency claim must be brought while 
a person is a director of the company or within 24 months after the 
director has vacated his or her position (ibid para 71). In any event, as 
correctly emphasised by the court in OUTA v Myeni para 20, a director 
may not use collective decision-making to evade individual responsibility, 
since the Companies Act sets out individual statutory duties of directors 
(see s 76(2) and (3)). The King III Report on Governance for South Africa 
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2009 (‘King III Report’), which was applicable during the relevant events 
covered in this case, likewise states that the board has a reflective role with 
collective authority and decision-making as a board, but directors carry 
individual responsibility (principle 2.14, recommended practice 16).
Apart from the 24-month restriction, a prescription period has not 
been imposed under s 162 of the Companies Act regarding the time 
period within which an application must be brought to declare a person 
a delinquent director (see further Rehana Cassim ‘Delinquent directors 
under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited 
2016 ZASCA 35’ (2016) 19 PER/PELJ 1 at 14 and Piet Delport Henochsberg 
on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Service 24, 2020) 569). It is arguable that 
the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 would not apply in this instance because 
this statute applies primarily in regard to the acquisition of ownership by 
prescription, the acquisition and extinction of servitudes by prescription, 
and the prescription of debts, while s 162 of the Companies Act relates to 
a declaration which affects the status of a person. The plaintiffs’ allegations 
against Myeni relate to her conduct during the period 2013 to 2016. Since 
a prescription period has not been imposed under s 162 of the Companies 
Act, Myeni’s conduct as far back as 2013 could validly be used as a basis for 
the delinquency application, provided that such conduct took place while 
she was a director of SAA. 
The locus standi of OUTA to bring the delinquency proceedings 
The persons who have locus standi under s 162 of the Companies Act 
to apply to court to declare a director delinquent are the company, a 
shareholder, director, company secretary, prescribed officer, a registered 
trade union that represents employees of the company or another employee 
representative, the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission 
(‘CIPC’), the Takeover Regulation Panel (‘TRP’) and an organ of state 
responsible for the administration of any legislation (s 162(2), (3) and (4)). 
The delinquency application against Myeni was brought by both SAAPA 
and OUTA. SAAPA is a branch of the Air Line Pilots’ Association of South 
Africa, which is a registered trade union in terms of s 96 of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995, and represents pilots in the employ of SAA. 
While SAAPA’s locus standi was not disputed, Myeni raised a special plea 
that OUTA did not have locus standi and that it required the leave of the 
court before instituting the delinquency proceedings in the public interest 
(see Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse NPC v Myeni [2019] ZAGPPHC 957) 
(‘the public interest application’).
Since OUTA does not appear on the face of it as a person or entity 
with locus standi under s 162 to institute delinquency proceedings, its 
summons was issued under s 157(1)(d) of the Companies Act, which 
provides for an extended right of standing. This section states that where 
an application may be made to, or a matter may be brought before a 
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court, the Companies Tribunal, the TRP or the CIPC in terms of the 
Companies Act, the right to do so may be exercised by a person acting in 
the public interest, with leave of the court. OUTA argued that its public 
interest in the matter arose from its primary objectives, which include the 
protection and advancement of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa 1996, the promotion of effective and enforceable taxation policies 
which are free from corruption, and the proper management of all major 
public entities (para 2).
A person acting in the public interest bears the onus of identifying the 
relevant public interest in which he or she is acting (Chris Jafta ‘Critical 
analysis of the extended legal standing provisions under section 157(1) of 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008 to apply for legal remedies’ (2015) 1 Journal 
of Corporate and Commercial Law & Practice 35 at 41). Yet, guidance on the 
meaning of the phrase ‘acting in the public interest’ is not provided in the 
Companies Act. In Ferreira v Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell NO 1996 (1) 
SA 984 (CC) para 234 the court held that relevant factors to determine 
whether a person is genuinely acting in the public interest are whether 
there is another effective manner in which the challenge could be brought; 
the nature of the relief sought and the extent to which it is of general and 
prospective application; the range of persons who may be affected by any 
court order, and the opportunity that those persons have had to present 
evidence and argument to the court. In Recycling and Economic Development 
Initiative of South Africa NPC v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2019 (3) SA 
251 (SCA) para 135 the Supreme Court of Appeal regarded a consideration 
of alternative remedies as being a key factor in this context. 
The court held that OUTA did indeed have a public interest in bringing 
legal proceedings against Myeni because it represents taxpayers, who 
partly foot the bill of SAA through paying their taxes, and who therefore 
have an interest in how a company such as SAA is run (the public interest 
application para 32). It is in the interests of justice, the court said, that 
the public interest is both advanced and protected due to the nature of 
SAA as a state-owned entity (ibid). On whether leave had to be obtained 
prior to the institution of the action by OUTA, the court was influenced 
by the dictum in Minister of Environmental Affairs v Recycling and Economic 
Development Initiative of South Africa NPC 2018 (3) SA 604 (WCC), which 
held that if a court could decide on the papers whether relief should 
be granted under s 157(1)(d), a separate application for leave would not 
be required (para 189). The court ruled that leave of the court did not 
have to be obtained prior to the institution of the action by OUTA and, 
considering the allegations made in the particulars of claim, read with 
the special plea and admissions made in the plea, it could determine the 
issue by way of a special plea (the public interest application para 25). 
The fact that OUTA and SAAPA were represented by the same legal 
representatives and had the same legal case swayed the court in deciding 
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that OUTA had locus standi, particularly since its involvement would 
not result in any significant increase in costs (para 33). Even if OUTA 
had been denied standing, the delinquency application could have been 
continued by SAAPA, assuming it had the means to do so, since SAAPA 
had locus standi by virtue of being a registered trade union representing 
pilots in the employ of SAA.
OUTA v Myeni considerably extends the list of persons who may apply 
to court to declare a director delinquent. In particular, it exposes directors 
of state-owned entities to delinquency proceedings by any persons who 
can show that they are acting in the public interest. While OUTA is to 
be commended for bringing delinquency proceedings against Myeni, 
together with SAAPA, it is submitted that directors, prescribed officers 
and the company secretary of a state-owned entity, who have first-hand 
knowledge of any directorial misconduct, must take steps at an early stage 
to hold such directors accountable. While these persons may be reluctant 
to do so due to the fear of personal repercussions and concerns over the 
legal costs associated with court proceedings, delaying such proceedings 
may have dire consequences for the South African public and economy, 
as was demonstrated with regard to SAA. In any event, if successful, 
a court may award costs in favour of the plaintiff, even on an attorney-
and-client basis, as was done in OUTA v Myeni. It is submitted that the 
state too has a responsibility to take such steps. As the court emphasised, 
to serve on the board of a state-owned entity ‘should not be a privilege of 
the politically connected’ and that the ‘[g]overnment has, as custodian of 
the common good, an obligation to ensure that suitably qualified persons, 
with integrity are appointed in these positions’ (OUTA v Myeni para 276).
Grounds of delinquency 
Section 162(5) sets out a closed list of delinquency grounds. The plaintiffs’ 
action focused on a contravention of the grounds listed in s 162(5)(c). 
Under this provision, a court must make an order declaring a person to 
be a delinquent director if the person, while a director: (i) grossly abused 
the position of director; (ii) took personal advantage of information or an 
opportunity contrary to s 76(2)(a) of the Companies Act (i e to gain an 
advantage for the director, or for another person other than the company); 
(iii) intentionally or by gross negligence inflicted harm upon the company 
contrary to s 76(2)(a) of the Companies Act; (iv) acted in a manner that 
amounted to gross negligence, wilful misconduct or breach of trust in 
relation to the performance of the director’s functions within, and duties 
to, the company; or (v) acted in a manner contemplated in s 77(3)(a), (b) or 
(c) of the Companies Act (unauthorised acts, reckless trading and fraud). 
A declaration of delinquency must be based on one of the statutory grounds 
listed in s 162 of the Companies Act (Cook: Geoffrey v Hesber Impala (Pty) 
Ltd [2016] ZAGPJHC 23 para 60). It follows that in assessing whether 
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a director’s conduct contravenes one of the grounds listed in s 162(5)(c), 
the impugned conduct must be located in one of the specific legislated 
grounds (ibid).
It is settled that when interpreting legislation, the point of departure 
is the language of the provision itself, read in context and having regard 
to the purpose of the provision and the background to the preparation 
and production of the document (Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v 
Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) para 18; Airports Company 
South Africa v Big Five Duty Free (Pty) Ltd 2019 (5) SA 1 (CC) para 29; 
Airports Company South Africa SOC Ltd v Imperial Group Ltd 2020 (4) SA 17 
(SCA) para 22). A sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that leads to 
insensible or unbusinesslike results, or undermines the apparent purpose 
of the document (Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund (supra) para 18). 
In applying this approach to interpreting s 162 of the Companies 
Act, the purpose of the provision must be considered. Section 162 has 
an underlying protective purpose — it aims to ensure that those who 
invest in companies are protected against directors who engage in serious 
misconduct (Msimang NO v Katuliiba [2013] 1 All SA 580 (GSJ) para 29; 
Gihwala v Grancy Property Ltd 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 144; Lewis Group 
Ltd v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 40). The Memorandum on the 
Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008, Companies Bill [B 61D-2008] para 8 stated 
that the core purpose of the regime set out in what was at that point cl 162 
was to be a remedy available to shareholders and other stakeholders to hold 
directors accountable. A contextual approach suggests further that relevant 
legal and regulatory instruments must be considered in interpreting s 162. 
In this case, the PFMA is relevant to determining the delinquency of a 
director of a state-owned entity. In ascertaining whether Myeni’s conduct 
infringed the delinquency grounds in s 162, the court commendably 
adopted a contextual approach by considering the relevant provisions 
of the PFMA and the (then applicable) King III Report (see OUTA v 
Myeni paras 34 to 37), which SAA bound itself to observe in its 2014/2015 
SAA Shareholder’s Compact (see paras 35 and 38). For example, principle 
2.16 of the King III Report states that one of the core responsibilities of 
the chairperson is to set the ethical tone for the board and the company. 
The court stated that a failure by the chairperson to do this may support 
a finding of delinquency as set out in s 162(5) of the Companies Act 
(para 37). The court’s discussion of the delinquency grounds in OUTA v 
Myeni is evaluated below.
(i) Conflating the test of ‘gross negligence’ with the test of the duty of 
reasonable care, skill and diligence
The court stated that an objective and subjective standard must be applied 
in assessing gross negligence, and that this is made clear by s 76(3)(c) 
of the Companies Act (para 16). Section 76(3)(c) imposes a duty on 
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a director to exercise the powers and functions of a director with the 
degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be expected of 
a person carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as 
those carried out by that director, and having the general knowledge, 
skill and experience of that director. In applying the test of care, skill and 
diligence to Myeni, the court held that, objectively, Myeni’s conduct had 
to be weighed against the standards expected of a reasonable director in 
her position and, subjectively, her conduct had to be weighed against the 
skills, qualifications and experience possessed by her (ibid). The court thus 
applied a dual objective and subjective test in the context of the duty of 
care, skill and diligence in order to determine whether Myeni’s conduct 
constituted gross negligence. 
It is submitted, with respect, that the court misapplied the test for the 
duty of care, skill and diligence in order to ascertain gross negligence in 
the context of s 162(5)(c)(iii) and s 162(5)(c)(iv)(aa) of the Companies Act. 
The duty of care, skill and diligence in s 76(3)(c) is not a fiduciary duty but 
is based on delictual liability for negligence (Ex parte Lebowa Development 
Corporation Ltd 1989 (3) SA 71 (T) at 106; Du Plessis NO v Phelps 1995 (4) 
SA 165 (C) at 170), and is assessed in accordance with the principles of the 
common law relating to delict (see s 77(2)(b)). In MV Stella Tingas: Transnet 
Ltd t/a Portnet v Owners of the MV Stella Tingas 2003 (2) SA 473 (SCA) the 
Supreme Court of Appeal stated that while gross negligence is not an exact 
concept capable of precise definition, it differs from ordinary negligence 
in that it involves a departure from the standard of the reasonable person 
to such an extent that it may properly be categorised as extreme (para 7). 
In explaining the meaning of the term ‘gross negligence’ in the context 
of s 162(5)(c)(iv)(aa) of the Companies Act, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in Gihwala (supra) found that there was a long history of courts treating 
gross negligence as the equivalent of recklessness when dealing with the 
conduct of those responsible for the administration of companies, and 
that recklessness is plainly serious misconduct (para 44). (See e g Philotex 
(Pty) Ltd v Snyman; Braitex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman 1998 (2) SA 138 (SCA) at 
143–4; Ebrahim v Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 585 (SCA) 
para 13 and Tsung v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa 2013 
(3) SA 468 (SCA) paras 29–31.) In Msimang (supra) para 39 the court ruled 
that in the determination of ‘gross negligence’ in the context of s 162(5)(c) 
of the Companies Act, a court must have regard to the conduct of the 
directors in the performance of their duties as directors of the company in 
terms of the company’s memorandum of incorporation and the statutory 
framework. This approach was approved in Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd 
v Druker 2013 JDR 1360 (WCC) para 84. It is evident from the above 
dicta that the duty of reasonable care, skill and diligence is not a test to 
be used to assess gross negligence, as the court advocated in OUTA v 
Myeni para 16. 
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In assessing the duty of care, skill and diligence in the context of s 76(3)(c), 
both an objective and subjective test are applied (Farouk H I Cassim 
‘The duties and the liability of directors’ in Farouk H I Cassim et al (ed) 
Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) 559). In a similar vein, it is submitted 
that in determining whether the grounds in s 162(5)(c) of the Companies 
Act have been breached, courts apply both an objective and a subjective 
assessment (Rehana Cassim The Removal of Directors and Delinquency Orders 
under the South African Companies Act (2020) 268). The objective element 
lies in ascertaining whether the conduct in question meets the benchmarks 
of one of the delinquency grounds — for instance, whether it amounts to 
‘gross abuse’, ‘gross negligence’ or ‘wilful misconduct’, as referred to in 
s 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act and as defined in our law — while the 
subjective element lies in considering the background, qualifications and 
experience of the particular director. 
For example, in Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd v Druker (supra) the 
directors had consistently failed to hold annual general meetings and to 
prepare financial statements for presentation at annual general meetings. 
The court found this conduct to be grossly negligent, bordering on wilful 
misconduct or breach of trust in relation to the performance of their 
functions within, and duties to, the company (ibid para 88). In declaring 
the directors delinquent, the court drew attention to the fact that all the 
board members were persons with significant tertiary qualifications, there 
being a medical practitioner, a legal practitioner, an accounting practitioner 
and other directors who held doctoral qualifications in their respective 
areas of knowledge (ibid). For this reason, the court asserted that each one 
of the members of the board of directors ought to (and must) apply such 
skill as each of them possesses for the benefit of the company. In Gihwala 
(supra) a director had, inter alia, failed to ensure that the share register of 
the company had properly reflected the persons who were entitled to be 
registered as shareholders; failed to ensure that the company kept proper 
accounting records; and had appropriated financial benefits for himself to 
the exclusion of a shareholder. In declaring the director delinquent, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal held that his conduct amounted to gross abuse 
of the position of a director, gross negligence akin to recklessness, and 
breach of trust in relation to the performance of the director’s duties to the 
company (ibid paras 138–9). The court stressed that the director was both 
a businessman and attorney, the chairman of one of South Africa’s largest 
law firms, and one of the largest JSE-listed property loan stock companies 
(ibid para 136). These personal traits swayed the court to declare the 
director delinquent on the basis that his conduct was inexcusable. 
Based on the authority of these dicta, it is submitted that in OUTA v 
Myeni the court correctly applied both an objective and subjective test 
to determine whether Myeni’s conduct constituted gross negligence. 
But, with respect, it did so in the context of misapplying the test of 
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reasonable care, skill and diligence. It is submitted that the court reached 
the correct conclusion on Myeni’s conduct being grossly negligent, but 
for the wrong reasons. It is essential for courts to apply the correct legal 
principles in their reasoning, even if the end result may be the same, as 
failing to do so runs the risk of setting questionable legal precedents.
While directors do not need to have any special qualifications or 
experience for their office (unless a particular company makes this a 
requirement in its memorandum of incorporation), the reality is that 
nowadays directors, particularly of state-owned entities, are often carefully 
selected because of their skills, business experience and qualifications in 
the relevant industry. It is submitted that such directors have a greater 
responsibility to use their skills and experience for the company’s benefit. 
Their failure to do so may weigh against them in a delinquency application, 
as Myeni experienced.
(ii) Equating gross abuse of ‘the position of director’ with ‘gross abuse  
of power’
The court ruled that the letter which Myeni sent to Airbus in Sep - 
tember 2015 constituted ‘a gross abuse of power by her, as contemplated 
in s 162(5)(c)(i) of the Companies Act’ (OUTA v Myeni para 246). With 
respect, the court misstated the delinquency ground in s 162(5)(c)(i), as this 
ground is not a ‘gross abuse of power’ but a gross abuse of ‘the position of 
director’ (emphasis supplied). 
In Lewis Group Ltd (supra) the court stated that gross abuse of ‘the 
position of director’ must relate to the use of the position as director, and 
not the performance by the person concerned of his or her duties and 
functions as a director, because that is a matter dealt with in terms of 
s 162(5)(c)(iv) of the Companies Act (ibid para 14). In Gihwala (supra) the 
Supreme Court of Appeal held that a gross abuse of the position of director 
is not a trivial misdemeanour or an unfortunate fall from grace, and that 
‘[o]nly gross abuses of the position of director qualify’ (ibid para 143). In 
this case, the conduct of a director who had appropriated financial benefits 
for himself and had excluded a shareholder from the benefits of such 
investments to which he was entitled, was found by the court to constitute 
a gross abuse of the position of director as contemplated in s 162(5)(c)(i) 
(ibid para 138). (See further on gross abuse Demetriades v Tollie [2015] 
ZANCHC 17 para 60.) 
It is submitted that a gross abuse of the position of director must relate 
directly to one’s position of directorship, while a gross abuse of power is 
much wider and may relate to any power that has been conferred on the 
individual in any capacity, and not necessarily in the capacity of a director. 
By ruling that Myeni’s conduct constituted a ‘gross abuse of power by 
her, as contemplated in s 162(5)(c)(i) of the Companies Act’ the court, 
with respect, misconstrued the ground of gross abuse of the position of 
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director, and equated it with a gross abuse of power, thereby conferring 
a much wider interpretation to the ground of gross abuse of ‘the position 
of director’ — an unwarranted interpretation that goes beyond the scope 
of the statutory ground in s 162(5)(c)(i). As the Supreme Court of Appeal 
cautioned in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund (supra) para 18 ‘[ j]udges 
must be alert to, and guard against, the temptation to substitute what 
they regard as reasonable, sensible or businesslike for the words actually 
used’ as this ‘crosses the divide between interpretation and legislation’. 
It is submitted that Myeni’s conduct nonetheless did amount to a gross 
abuse of the position of director in that by sending the letter to Airbus in 
September 2015 in her capacity as a non-executive director of the SAA, 
she sought unilaterally to change the terms of the Airbus Swap transaction 
and to renegotiate a new deal without the approval of a board resolution 
authorising her to do so (see OUTA v Myeni paras 154–7). 
(iii) Dishonesty and failure to disclose material facts as a delinquency ground
As mentioned earlier, the court stated that a ‘further ground for declaration 
of delinquency’ is that Myeni’s application to the Minister of Finance to 
approve the s 54(2) application was ‘dishonest and failed to disclose material 
facts’ (OUTA v Myeni para 252). While Myeni’s actions may have been 
dishonest and she may have failed to disclose material facts, this is not a 
statutory ground of delinquency listed in s 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act. 
As discussed earlier, since the delinquency grounds in s 162 are a closed 
list, a court must identify a specific delinquency ground in order validly to 
declare a director delinquent and must locate the relevant conduct in one 
of the specific legislated grounds, as the court directed in Cook: Geoffrey 
(supra) para 60. 
Even though the court did not locate Myeni’s dishonest conduct in 
one of the specific legislated grounds in s 162 of the Companies Act, it 
is nevertheless arguable that Myeni’s dishonesty and failure to disclose 
material facts with regard to the s 54(2) application would fall under the 
delinquency ground in s 162(5)(c)(iv)(aa) of breach of trust in relation to 
the performance of the director’s functions and duties to the company. 
This argument is reinforced by the fact that directors of state-owned 
entities have an augmented duty of honesty and disclosure under the 
PFMA, as discussed further below. Section 50(1)(b) of the PFMA states that 
the board of a state-owned entity must act with fidelity, honesty, integrity 
and in the best interests of the entity in managing its financial affairs. 
Under s 50(1)(c) of the PFMA, the board of a state-owned entity must on 
request disclose to the executive authority or the legislature all material 
facts, including those reasonably discoverable, which may influence its 
decisions or actions. Myeni’s dishonesty and failure to disclose material 
facts in regard to the s 54(2) application contravened ss 50(1)(b) and (c) of 
the PFMA, which arguably amounts to a breach of trust in relation to the 
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performance of her functions and duties to SAA. This is a delinquency 
ground in terms of s 162(5)(c)(iv)(aa) of the Companies Act.
The criminalisation of a breach of fiduciary duties under the PFMA 
Directors of state-owned entities must comply with the provisions 
of the PFMA. The objects of the PFMA are to secure transparency, 
accountability and sound management of the revenue, expenditure, assets 
and liabilities of the institutions to which the Act applies (see s 2 of the 
PFMA; Nyathi v MEC for Department of Health, Gauteng 2008 (5) SA 94 (CC) 
paras 29 and 54; and Premier, Limpopo Province v Speaker of the Limpopo 
Provincial Government 2011 (6) SA 396 (CC) paras 26–7). This means that 
directors of state-owned entities have a duty to comply not only with the 
requirements of the Companies Act, but also with the requirements of 
the PFMA, as well as any other specific legislation governing the relevant 
state-owned entity. There is thus an enhanced duty on directors of state-
owned entities (OUTA v Myeni para 28). 
The board of a state-owned entity is the accounting authority of that 
entity (s 49(2) of the PFMA), and is in turn accountable to the ‘executive 
authority’ which, in the case of SAA, is the Minister of Finance (see s 1 
of the PFMA and Proc 88 in GG 38354 of 19 December 2014). Boards 
of state-owned entities must exercise the duty of utmost care to ensure 
reasonable protection of the assets and records of the public entity (s 50(1)(a)); 
act with fidelity, honesty, integrity and in the best interests of the public 
entity in managing the financial affairs of the public entity (s 50(1)(b)); on 
request, disclose to the executive authority or the legislature all material 
facts which may influence its decisions or actions (s 50(1)(c)); and seek to 
prevent any prejudice to the financial interests of the state (s 50(1)(d)). 
Board members may not use their position or confidential information 
obtained as a board member for personal gain or to improperly benefit 
another person (s 50(2)). A duty of disclosure is also imposed in that 
directors of state-owned entities are required to disclose to the board any 
personal business interest in any matter before the board and withdraw 
from that matter (unless the board decides that the interest is trivial or 
irrelevant) (s 50(3)). 
Section 51 of the PFMA sets out further responsibilities of the board, 
which include ensuring that the company maintains an efficient and 
transparent system of financial and risk management and internal control; 
that it takes effective steps to prevent irregular and wasteful expenditure; 
and that it manages available working capital efficiently and economically. 
The board of a state-owned entity is also subject to more stringent 
financial reporting duties than other companies, as set out in ss 55 
and 65 of the PFMA. Notably, in terms of s 86(2) of the PFMA, the 
board will be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or 
to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years if it wilfully or 
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in a grossly negligent way fails to comply with ss 50 (fiduciary duties), 
51 (general responsibilities) or 55 (duties relating to annual reports and 
financial statements) of the PFMA.
By delaying the conclusion of the Airbus Swap transaction and failing 
to disclose material facts, Myeni was found to have acted contrary to 
the duties of good faith and honesty in ss 50(1)(b) and (c) of the PFMA 
(OUTA v Myeni para 253). She was also found to have contributed wilfully 
and recklessly to SAA breaching its financial reporting obligations under 
s 55(1) of the PFMA (para 265). Notably, since a contravention of these 
provisions constitutes a criminal offence under s 86(2) of the PFMA, Myeni 
could be subjected to a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
five years. 
In sharp contrast, a breach by a director of his or her fiduciary duties 
under s 76 of the Companies Act will not constitute a criminal offence. 
A director may instead be held liable for any loss, damages or costs sustained 
by the company as a consequence of such breach (s 77(2)(a)). Yet, a breach 
by a director of a state-owned entity of the same or substantially similar 
fiduciary duties, including a failure to disclose a conflict of interest, will 
constitute a criminal offence, and may even result in imprisonment. This 
is contrary to the stance adopted by the Companies Act of decriminalising 
most of its provisions (see the Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies 
Bill, 2008 op cit paras 1.2.5 and 12 and Cassim ‘Introduction to the new 
Companies Act’ in Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law op cit at 26).
It is nevertheless submitted that s 86(2) of the PFMA is a commendable 
provision, as it underscores the gravity of a breach of fiduciary duties by 
directors of state-owned entities. A criminal conviction for a breach of 
duties under the PFMA may serve as a deterrent to stem the high level of 
corruption currently prevalent in state-owned entities in South Africa. 
Moreover, compliance with the duties relating to annual reports and 
financial statements in a state-owned entity is imperative, since a failure 
to comply with such duties would deprive the public at large of effective 
oversight of the finances of the state-owned entity, and would jeopardise 
its ability to raise funding (OUTA v Myeni para 269). A director serving on 
the board of a state-owned entity ‘has a sacred duty to society and should 
ensure that state resources are not squandered, or the economy placed at 
risk’ (para 276).
The court ordered its judgment and the evidence led in the trial to 
be referred to the NPA for determination of whether an investigation 
regarding possible criminal conduct should follow (para 285). It directed 
the NPA to include the other relevant SAA board members in such an 
investigation (para 271). The court’s reason for the referral of its judgment 
to the NPA is not entirely clear from the judgment. All that the court 
stated was that Myeni’s actions during the negotiations of the Emirates 
deal were inexplicable, and that there existed a reasonable possibility that 
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‘something sinister was going on behind the scenes’ (ibid). This, the court 
stated, constituted sufficient ground for the NPA to consider the evidence 
presented and investigate the circumstances surrounding the Emirates deal 
and the Airbus Swap transaction (ibid). 
One basis for the referral of the matter to the NPA could be that Myeni’s 
breach of her fiduciary and other duties under the PFMA constitutes a 
criminal offence. Notably, s 162 of the Companies Act is a civil remedy, 
but does not invoke criminal liability (see further Grancy Property Ltd v 
Gihwala 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) para 155). The assessment of whether 
Myeni was delinquent was thus determined by the court on a civil standard 
of proof and on a balance of probabilities. Since the NPA must prove 
its case on a criminal standard of proof and beyond a reasonable doubt, 
which is a heavier onus, it may not necessarily be able to rely solely on the 
evidence presented in the trial.
Another possible reason for the referral of the matter to the NPA 
could be perjury, which is a criminal offence (see R v Beukman 1950 (3) 
SA 261 (O) at 263; S v Thompson 1968 (3) SA 425 (E) at 427; Black v 
Joffe 2007 (3) SA 171 (C) para 15). In Myeni’s earlier postponement 
application she had pleaded poverty as the reason for not attending the 
court proceedings, but later claimed that it was unfair to expect her to 
spend her own money on the court proceedings when she believed that 
SAA’s insurers ought to have covered these costs (Outa v Myeni para 282). 
This claim, the court found, substantially contradicted Myeni’s previous 
pleas of poverty and demonstrated that she had perjured herself on affidavit 
(ibid). The court found that Myeni had failed to put a proper version to 
the witnesses in the course of cross-examination, and that she could have 
been in a better position to instruct her counsel properly had she attended 
the court proceedings (para 235). It is notable that the court’s credibility 
findings against Myeni impacted its costs order. For example, the court’s 
finding that Myeni had admitted to exercising a deliberate choice not 
to attend the court proceedings despite its repeated warnings that this 
would compromise her defence, together with its findings that she had 
been dishonest with the court and an unreliable witness, led the court to 
impose a punitive costs order on her (paras 279, 282 and 284).
The duration of delinquency order
Under s 162(6)(a) of the Companies Act, an unconditional lifetime delin-
quency declaration must be imposed on a person who consented to serve 
as a director or acted in the capacity of a director or prescribed officer 
while ineligible or disqualified to do so, and on a person who acted in 
a manner that contravened a probation order. In all other instances, the 
delinquency declaration subsists for seven years from the date of the order 
or such longer period as determined by the court, and may be made subject 
to any conditions the court considers appropriate, including conditions 
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limiting the application of the declaration to one or more particular 
cate gories of companies (s 162(6)(b)). In exercising its discretion to extend 
the delinquency declaration to Myeni’s lifetime, the court did not impose 
any conditions to the order. This is the first time in South African 
law that a lifelong declaration of delinquency has been imposed on a 
delin quent director. 
In Companies and Intellectual Property Commission v Zwane [2019] 
ZAGPPHC 381, which was the first delinquency declaration against a 
director of a state-owned entity, the court did not exercise its discretion 
to extend its order for longer than seven years. It held that a director of 
the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation SOC Ltd (‘NECSA’) who 
had solicited and accepted director’s emoluments in circumstances in which 
he was not entitled to do so, had acted in a manner that amounted to wilful 
misconduct and breach of trust in relation to the performance of his duties 
to NECSA, as contemplated by s 162(5)(c)(iv)(aa) of the Companies Act 
(ibid para 56). Zwane argued that it was a grey area whether he was entitled 
to receive such emoluments. The court, however, found that Zwane knew 
that he was not entitled to receive director’s emoluments from NECSA 
without the requisite permission to do this (ibid para 53). It ruled that 
Zwane had deliberately avoided seeking permission for the receipt of such 
emoluments, because he knew that if he drew attention to his position 
by requesting permission to be paid, such permission would be refused 
(ibid). Such conduct, the court held, amounted to wilful misconduct and 
breach of trust in relation to the performance of the director’s duties to 
NECSA (ibid para 56). In the course of its judgment, the court drew 
attention to Zwane’s business experience and the fact that he was an 
experienced chartered accountant (ibid para 3). Notwithstanding Zwane’s 
wilful misconduct and breach of trust as a director of a state-owned entity, 
together with his extensive business experience, the court did not deem it 
necessary to impose a delinquency declaration of longer than seven years. 
In imposing a lifelong delinquency declaration in OUTA v Myeni, the 
court appears to have been influenced by its finding that Myeni contributed 
significantly to the position in which SAA and the economy finds itself 
today (OUTA v Myeni para 271). It held that a lifelong delinquency order 
was justified since Myeni did not act as a reasonable director in light of 
her extensive experience as a director; she failed to give any reasonable 
explanation for her numerous failures, misrepresentations and actions, and 
‘failed abysmally in executing her fiduciary duty’ (para 273). The court 
ruled further that Myeni was not a fit and proper person to be appointed 
as a director of any company, let alone a board member of a state-owned 
entity (ibid). 
The court stated that a lifelong delinquency declaration still offers the 
‘hope of some redemption’ (para 274) in that Myeni may apply to court 
after three years for the declaration of delinquency to be suspended in 
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terms of s 162(11) and (12) (ibid). Under s 162(11)(a), a delinquent director 
may, at any time three years after the order of delinquency was made, 
apply to court to suspend the delinquency order and to substitute it for a 
probation order (see s 162(7)), with or without conditions. A person who 
is subsequently placed under a probation order by way of substitution of 
the delinquency order may apply to court at any time more than two years 
thereafter for an order setting aside the probation order (s 162(11)(b)(i)). 
The implication of a successful application under s 162(11) is that, in effect, 
the minimum period of a delinquency order is three years. A court may 
grant the order if, having regard to the circumstances leading to the original 
order and the applicant’s conduct in the ensuing period, it is satis fied that 
the applicant has demonstrated satisfactory progress towards rehabilitation 
and there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant would be able to serve 
successfully as a director of a company in the future (s 162(12)(b)). 
It is submitted that Myeni’s prospects of success of an application under 
s 162(11) are slim, particularly since the court did not impose any conditions 
to the delinquency declaration. If, for instance, the court had imposed a 
condition restricting Myeni to act as a director of a private company, she 
would have been in a position to demonstrate to the court, after three 
years, that she had successfully carried out her duties as a director in this 
capacity, that she had made satisfactory progress towards rehabilitation, and 
that there was a reasonable prospect of being able to serve successfully as a 
director in the future. It would be challenging for Myeni to demonstrate 
this to the court when she has been absolutely prohibited from acting as 
a director. It is nevertheless submitted that Myeni could present evidence 
to the court demonstrating progress towards rehabilitation in a capacity 
other than a director, such as a manager of a company (in the capacity of 
an employee). In considering the circumstances leading to the original 
order, it is submitted that it is likely that the fact that Myeni was found to 
have been dishonest with the court (see OUTA v Myeni para 279) would 
weigh against her application (on the application under s 162(11) and (12) 
see further Jean du Plessis & Piet Delport ‘“Delinquent directors” and 
“directors under probation”: A unique South African approach regarding 
disqualification of company directors’ (2017) 134 SALJ 274 at 284; Rehana 
Cassim ‘The suspension and setting aside of delinquency and probation 
orders under the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ 2019 (22) PER/PELJ 2 and 
Cassim The Removal of Directors and Delinquency Orders under the South 
African Companies Act op cit at 300–24). Thus, while there is ‘some hope 
of redemption’ (OUTA v Myeni para 274) for Myeni to serve as a company 
director after three years, it is submitted that such hope is slim.
In Kukama v Lobelo 2012 JDR 0062 (GSJ) para 21 the court ruled that 
it is not necessary to order the removal of a delinquent director from 
the company due to the ‘automatic inherent effect of the order declaring 
a person to be delinquent in terms of s 162(5) of the Companies Act’. 
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(See further Msimang (supra) para 32.) It was thus not necessary for the 
court to order Myeni’s removal as a director from the other companies of 
which she is currently a director, since this would be automatic. 
CONCLUSION
While OUTA v Myeni is not the first case in which a director of a state-owned 
entity has been declared delinquent, it is the first judgment in which a 
court has imposed a lifelong delinquency declaration on a director. 
The judgment is also noteworthy for the reason that it highlights the 
impact of the PFMA (with regard to directors of state-owned entities) 
on the interpretation of the delinquency grounds under s 162 of the 
Companies Act. A further reason why this judgment is noteworthy is 
that it is the first delinquency application brought by a party acting in 
the public interest. While the judgment affirms that any person acting in 
the public interest may apply to court to declare a director delinquent, 
it is submitted that directors, prescribed officers, the company secretary 
and the state must take the initiative at the earliest stage possible to hold 
delinquent directors of state-owned entities accountable, as failing to do 
so may have severe consequences for the South African public and the 
economy, as has occurred with SAA. 
Regrettably, it is submitted that the court, with respect, misapplied the test 
for the duty of care, skill and diligence in order to ascertain gross negligence 
in the context of s 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act. Nevertheless it is arguable 
that the court reached the correct conclusion on Myeni’s conduct being 
grossly negligent. It is further submitted that the court erroneously equated 
a gross abuse of ‘the position of director’ with a ‘gross abuse of power’, 
thereby giving a much wider interpretation to the phrase gross abuse of ‘the 
position of director’ that goes beyond the scope of the statutory ground in 
s 162(5)(c)(i). It is nonetheless submitted that Myeni’s conduct did amount to 
a gross abuse of the position of director. It is also of concern that the court 
appeared to construe dishonesty and a failure to disclose material facts as 
a ground of delinquency, when this ground is not listed in s 162(5) of the 
Companies Act. Despite this, it is submitted that the ground of breach of 
trust set out in s 162(5)(c)(iv)(aa) would encompass the dishonesty offence in 
this case, and that there are other grounds of delinquency which justified 
the court’s delinquency order, such as Myeni acting without authority, in 
contravention of s 162(5)(c)(iv)(bb) of the Companies Act. 
An notable feature of this judgment is that large portions of it are lifted, 
almost verbatim, from OUTA’s heads of argument. This applies not only 
to the court’s discussion of the facts, but also to its discussion of the legal 
principles and the orders proposed by OUTA in its heads of argument. 
As the Constitutional Court has stated, while some reliance on and 
invocation of counsel’s heads of argument is not improper, it is preferable 
for a judgment to be written in the own words of the judge instead of 
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reproducing counsel’s heads of argument, in order to avoid any perception 
of  bias (Stuttafords Stores (Pty) Ltd v Salt of the Earth Creations (Pty) Ltd 2011 (1) 
SA 256 (CC) paras 11–12; see further on this point Minister of Police v 
Vowana 2019 (4) SA 297 (ECM) paras 21–5). 
A lifelong declaration of delinquency does not mean a criminal sanction 
— but it would substantially interfere with Myeni’s entrepreneurial 
freedom, and carry a stigma and consequent extensive reputational damage. 
While Myeni may apply to court after three years for the suspension of 
her delinquency order, as argued above, the prospects of success of such 
an application are poor. It remains to be seen whether Myeni succeeds 
in appealing this judgment and whether the NPA pursues a criminal 
investigation into Myeni’s conduct. The judgment nevertheless serves to 
send a stern warning to errant directors of state-owned entities about their 
conduct, which they would be wise to heed.
POSTSCRIPT
On 22 December 2020 the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria dismissed 
Myeni’s application for leave to appeal (Myeni v Organisation Undoing Tax 
Abuse; Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse v Myeni [2020] ZAGPPHC 779). 
The court also granted the application by OUTA and SAAPA for the 
immediate enforcement of the delinquency order against Myeni, pending the 
finalisation of all appeal processes. This meant that Myeni had to relinquish 
all her directorships immediately, pending any further appeal processes.
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